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Abstract 
This note discusses the UK government’s proposed reforms to the land use planning system.  
It considers the case for reform and the extent to which the reforms are likely to meet their 
objectives. It then makes some suggestions on how the National Planning Policy Framework 
could be improved.  It should be read alongside our companion evidence paper: ‘What we 
know (and don’t know) about the links between planning and economic performance’. 
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Introduction1 
 
The Government is seeking to reform England’s planning rules. The current system involves: 
 A hierarchy of planning policies – national planning policy statements; until recently 
regional strategies; and local development frameworks.  
 Development control as the main mechanism for regulating local development.  
 Section 106 (S106) as the main means of local value capture, complemented in 2010 
by the Community Infrastructure Levy. 
 Some national restrictions (e.g. Town Centre First Green Belts, Sites of Special 
Scientific Interest (SSSIs) and Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONBs)). 
 
The Government’s draft National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) was unveiled over the 
summer of 2011. The main elements of the NPPF and associated reforms are: 
 Significantly simplified national planning guidance.  
 Devolved decision-making, with local authorities drawing up local plans via 
community consultation, subject to consistency with NPPF and fiscal incentives to 
encourage development. 
 A presumption in favour of sustainable development, where this accords with local 
plans. If no up-to-date plan exists, the default answer to sustainable development 
should be ‘yes’. 
 Maintain all existing protected status – that is Green Belt, SSSIs, AONBs and also 
retain town centre first restrictions for retail development. 
 
In parallel with the NPPF, the government are also introducing:  
 A reformed Community Infrastructure Levy as the main means of value capture, 
while limiting use of S106.  
 Financial incentives for new housing through the New Homes Bonus, and for 
commercial development via the Business Increase Bonus. 
 A Localism Bill and wider proposals for reforming local government finance. 2 
 
Together, these reforms aim to localise the planning system at the same time as increasing 
rates of commercial and residential development. As we discuss below there are tensions 
between these two objectives. 
 
Do we need reform?  
 
Nathan and Overman (2011) document evidence that the UK planning system: 
 Increases house prices (with a regressive impact on low to middle income families) 
 Increases housing market volatility  
 Increases office rents 
 Lowers retail productivity 
 Lowers employment in small independent retailers 
 May not properly assess the true social costs of brownfield versus greenfield 
development. 
 
1
 This section is taken from our companion piece on the economic costs and benefits of planning. 
2
  See DCLG (2011a, 2011b, 2011c and 2011d). 
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Other costs of the current system are not well documented (e.g. the possible negative impact, 
via higher land prices, on land intensive manufacturing and wholesale distribution) but might 
be expected to be large. In short, the evidence suggests that the current English planning 
system imposes substantial economic, social and environmental costs, which need to be set 
against the system’s benefits (for more on these benefits, see CPRE 2011, National Trust 
2011 and many others).  
 
For what it is worth, we differ on whether some of these costs outweigh their respective 
benefits. However, we are both very clear that those involved in the current planning debate 
need to be aware of all the evidence, and that pretending that the status quo is cost-free is not 
helpful.
3
 We also believe that while the Government’s NPPF proposals have much to 
commend them, there are some important areas where they could be improved.   
 
The overall direction of travel for the planning system is a decision for politicians, held 
accountable by voters. Clearly voters’ opinions will differ and politicians need to balance 
these opinions. If, for example, you believe that the costs of the status quo outweigh the 
benefits, reducing these costs will require more land to be made available for development. 
Not all of this land could, or should, have been previously developed (partly because much 
brownfield land is in the ‘wrong’ place) so this will entail some building on greenfield land. 
You would be willing to make this trade-off because you do not believe that the broad social 
value of the undeveloped land that will end up being used is sufficient to outweigh the broad 
costs in terms of high house prices, increased house price volatility, high office rents, lower 
retail productivity etc. This corresponds to the personal position of one of the authors.  
 
Even if you happen to disagree with this assessment of the evidence however, this does not 
mean that you should oppose a suitably revised National Planning Framework. The rest of 
this note explains why. 
 
The basic principles of the NPPF 
 
The objective of the planning system 
Planning systems influence the level, location and pattern of activity. Most people, including 
the government, agree that the planning system should seek to promote sustainable 
development – that is, to balance economic, social and environmental objectives.  
 
The NPPF calls for more use to be made of market price signals in the land use planning 
system. Because the current system effectively makes no use of price signals it is arguable 
that it downplays economic objectives in preference to other objectives. As Cheshire and 
Sheppard (2005) argue, however, it is important that decisions in a reformed system should 
not be made on the grounds of market signals in isolation, but should continue to reflect 
environmental and amenity values.  
 
As we argue below, this means the NPPF should be more explicit about what sustainable 
development involves and should indicate how such judgements could be made in practice.   
 
Localism is better than top down planning 
 
3
 See, for example, the CPRE quoted in http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/business/article3168127.ece 
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Ideally, decisions are best taken by the community most affected, and so the general principle 
of localism is the right one. The NPPF enshrines this principle by insisting on the use of local 
plans to underpin decisions about development. However, there are some classes of decision 
where it is harder to justify taking only local views into account. We discuss these below and 
consider the way that NPPF handles the conflict between local and national interest. 
 
The presumption in favour of sustainable development 
Because development involves large upfront fixed costs it is good if the planning system can 
help limit uncertainty. In addition, planning decisions can generate large ‘rents’ for those 
gaining planning permission to build. For both these reasons it is important that decision 
making is transparent and governed by clear rules. The current system is so complex that it 
does not meet these criteria. The NPPF achieves this by vastly simplifying the rules and by 
introducing a presumption in favour of sustainable development. Local bureaucrats and 
politicians will no longer get to say yes or no to development on a case-by-case basis. 
Instead, the presumption means that they have to say yes to things that are consistent with 
their local plan. Many other countries successfully run systems that are (at least) this 
permissive. But it is less clear that this principle can be brought in immediately, given that 
many local areas do not have current local plans (see below).  
 
Localism and the national interest: the role of incentives 
If, as this government does, you believe in localism then you have to give people a strong say 
in the development of their local plan to make the 'presumption' consistent with localism. The 
draft framework does this by giving neighbourhoods and local authorities a central role in 
drawing up local plans. However, in some cases there is an unavoidable trade-off between 
local and national interests. For example, the Government wants to increase housing supply 
in England and improve the UK’s strategic infrastructure. These are both national priorities – 
but ones which will affect specific local communities.  
 
The government is taking two approaches to try to reconcile national and local priorities. The 
first is to retain some features of a top-down system by insisting that local authorities find 
‘enough’ land for development. The second is to try to align local and national priorities by 
giving incentives to local communities to take decisions consistent with national interest. 
Specifically, the Government recognise that local authorities will need to be given incentives 
to agree to new development and have introduced a range of measures to provide these.  
 
The case in principle 
Overall, there are strong arguments that support the government’s overall approach to 
reforming the land use planning system.  
 
Despite this, some people support the status quo. Even, amongst those that recognise the need 
to do something (e.g. about the affordability of housing) many object to the NPPF. We think 
that the NPPF could be revised to meet many (although not all) of these objections. 
 
A revised NPPF 
 
The NPPF needs a clear statement of the primary objective of the planning system 
The planning system should seek to balance economic, social and environmental objectives. 
The NPPF needs to explicitly recognise that this is the primary objective, and to put in place a 
clear definition of ‘sustainable development’, the trade-offs this may entail in practice, and 
how such decisions could be made.  
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Happily, there is now a growing evidence base that would allow national and local planners 
to make decisions that properly take account of these objectives, using, for example, 
information on the value of natural amenities. We discuss the practicalities of this below.  
 
The NPPF needs to clarify when localism trumps national interests (and vice-versa) 
There is a basic tension in the Government’s approach – between localism and achieving 
these national goals. As the National Trust have correctly pointed out in their response to the 
NPPF (National Trust 2011), the proposed reforms appear asymmetric on the extent to which 
neighbourhoods have power to affect local development. Specifically, local people can 
decide to allow more development, but not less.  
 
Ministers need to address this problem. Generally, development imposes costs on existing 
residents to benefit non-residents. One possibility is for the government to overrule 
neighbourhood interests in the name of local interests and continue to allow upward only 
revisions to local plans. If you believe in localism, it is of course politically difficult to do 
this. A second possibility is to continue to allow upward only revisions to local plans but to 
clarify the ways in which the financial benefits from allowing development (which are paid to 
local authorities) will filter down to local neighbourhoods affected. A third possibility would 
be to allow upward and downward revisions to local plans, but this would likely require far 
stronger fiscal incentives at the neighbourhood level if plans are not to be consistently revised 
downwards by rational householders looking to protect their vested interest. 
 
What happens in the absence of a local plan? 
As outlined, there are very good reasons to prefer a planning system built around local plans 
with a presumption in favour of sustainable development that is consistent with the plan. One 
of the major problems, however, is that many local authorities do not have current local 
plans. The NPPF insists that where no local plan is present then the default answer to 
development should be ‘yes’. There is a short term and a long term problem with this 
mechanism for dealing with the availability of a local plan.  
 
The short term problem relates to both the absence of plans and the fact that all local 
authorities should be adjusting their plans to take in to account the new planning framework. 
The government needs to come up with an interim solution to this problem. The most 
sensible approach would be to allow the current system of planning consents to operate while 
local authorities are given a reasonable amount of time to draw up new plans. This may 
conflict with government desires to see construction-led growth (although we question the 
extent to which this is a feasible objective given current market conditions). In the long run, 
plans need to be kept up-to-date. But there is no need to do this through the ‘threat’ of 
unconstrained development. Other mechanisms, including financial sanctions could be used 
to ensure that plans are kept up-to-date. 
 
Localism and the national interest: what if incentives are too small? 
The Government’s localism strategy relies heavily on incentives – nudging local 
communities to decide on actions that collectively meet national objectives. Whether these 
incentives will be large enough in practice to achieve the goal of raising levels of national 
housing supply is still open to debate, and some commentators have already suggested 
doubling the size of the New Homes Bonus (Larkin et al 2011). We agree that there a serious 
concerns that the incentives may be too small. Early evidence on housing starts since the 
announcement of the NHB are consistent with these concerns. 
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One way the government can address this problem is to increase the overall incentive to 
develop by allowing local authorities to retain a larger, rather than smaller, share of business 
rate growth. A decision on this is due in the coming months. The government also needs a set 
of mechanisms in place for reviewing the full package of incentives and the extent to which 
current fiscal incentives are proving effective and to allow for adjustment if necessary. Any 
review process will have to carefully balance the need to create appropriate incentives with 
the fact that uncertainty will dampen the effect of any given level of incentives. There are a 
number of possible options. At a minimum, the system should ensure no retrospective 
revisions on development already approved. Another alternative would be upward only 
revisions subject to a more general review occurring, say, every five years. Longer term, 
other mechanisms could be considered such as land auctions, which offer stronger incentives 
for development and a more transparent process (Leunig 2007).  
 
Land restrictions and the definition of sustainable development.  
The NPPF continues to impose some centralised restrictions on land use – most obviously in 
the case of the Green Belt and Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB). The long 
standing ‘town-centre first’ policy will also be maintained for the retail sector. In the draft 
version, there is no intention to have national brownfield targets, although the government is 
coming under sustained pressure to (re)introduce a ‘brownfield first’ criterion. 
 
For AONB and some other designations, it is clear that the government has decided that 
national interests strictly overrule local interests. For greenbelts, town-centre first and 
brownfield first policy the case for a one-size fits all policy is far less compelling. Indeed, we 
would argue that the NPPF should take a more flexible approach, explicitly permitting cities 
to develop local brownfield and town-centre strategies if desired, via consultation with local 
people. We recognise that substantial changes to greenbelt policy are unlikely to prove 
politically expedient given the current popular debate. 
 
Once again, however, this is an area where local interests may conflict with national and the 
NPPF needs more detail on how these should be reconciled. One possibility would be for 
government to propose a set of indicators that local authorities could use when developing 
their town centre and brownfield plans. These indicators could reflect the exchequer costs of 
e.g. the provision of infrastructure for greenfield development as well as the environmental 
and social value of different types of land (already available from the National Ecosystem 
Assessment).
4
 Local authorities would then be able to draw up their own land use restriction 
policies using these indicators and other local information. This approach might also help 
operationalise the concept of whether or not a given development is sustainable. Because 
such an approach recognises that what constitutes sustainable development might differ 
depending on local context we think it would be preferable to the alternative – which would 
use current planning assumptions about what is sustainable to issue national guidance on 
what is meant by sustainable development (not least because the NPPF is trying to get away 
from this national guidance approach to planning). A more radical approach might be to 
reform the planning system further to uses these base line indicators to develop impact fees 
that could be levied on new development. 
 
 
4
 See http://uknea.unep-wcmc.org/ and (Gibbons et al 2011). This could include guidance on the shadow price 
of carbon. 
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Opponents of the NPPF may want to skew development further in favour of brownfield land. 
They should be encouraged to bring forward costed proposals that explain how this might be 
achieved. Some of these may involve removing existing distortions, such as the significant 
differences in VAT levied on refurbishment as opposed to new build development. These 
proposals could then be embedded within the NPPF and, once again, local authorities allowed 
to choose the most appropriate land restriction policies in light of these brownfield incentives.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
We believe that there are strong arguments in favour of the overall approach to land use 
planning as advocated by the NPPF. The NPPF proposes a planning system where local plans 
are drawn up in consultation with local communities subject to a set of incentives that 
balance economic, environmental and social objectives. It then allows development that is 
consistent with the plan. 
 
The status quo has both benefits and substantive economic and social costs, as we point out in 
the evidence paper that accompanies this one (Nathan and Overman 2011). Those opposing 
planning reform should acknowledge these costs of the current system – rather than, as some 
have done, denying that they exist. This said, the NPPF and wider proposals for planning 
reform have room for improvement, and we find common ground with other voices here. We 
have highlighted several crucial issues:  
 
 The NPPF needs to explicitly recognise that the primary objective of the planning 
system is to balance economic, social and environmental objectives. The Framework 
should set out a clear definition of sustainable development, acknowledge potential 
tradeoffs and give guidance on how practical decisions might be made (e.g. through 
use of carbon prices and the National Ecosystem Assessment) 
 
 Most planning decisions are best taken by the community affected, and so the general 
principle of localism is the right one. But in some cases, there are local and national 
dimensions to a decision. There is a basic tension between localism and some national 
objectives, which the NPPF does not properly acknowledge or resolve. Either 
ministers need to be clear about when and why national interests trump local and local 
trump neighbourhood or they need to provide stronger incentives to align 
neighbourhood, local and national interests. 
 
 The presumption in favour of sustainable development that is consistent with the plan 
should be retained. But it should not be used as the mechanism to ensure that plans 
are up-to-date. Interim measures are also needed, while all local authorities up-date 
their plans to take in to account the new national framework. 
 
 It is not clear that current incentives will be large enough to achieve national 
objectives in terms of delivering more land for development. The government needs 
to explain how it will review and update incentives if necessary. Ironically, while we 
favour more development, we support the proposals in the NPPF despite the fact that 
we think it is highly likely that they could lead to less not more development in the 
short to medium term. 
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 The case for one-size fits all land restriction policies (e.g. town centre or brownfield 
first) is not compelling. Instead, the government should adopt an approach in keeping 
with the localism spirit of the NPPF by setting the appropriate framework to try to 
encourage particular patterns of development but then to allow local authorities to 
develop their own land use restriction policies. We think such a framework should 
take the form of a set of baseline indicators that highlight the environmental and 
social costs of different types of development. This could also form a basis for 
helping assess whether or not development is sustainable. We think this would be 
preferable to alternative approaches which would impose national guidelines on land 
use restrictions and the definition of sustainable development. If opponents of the 
NPPF want to skew development further in favour of brownfield sites they should 
bring forward costed proposals that could form part of the framework within which 
local authorities draw up their policies. 
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